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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
really the only case that held the issuance of a pass raised a federal question, and
subject to decisions of the federal courts. Following this, the Court relied on the
Adams and Boering cases without a judicial review of the same. At that time, the
validity of the Adams case could have been upheld on two theories, one, the old
"transcendental law" theory of Swift v. Tyson, the other, the exclusive power of
the federal courts regarding interpretation of a federal law. The second theory
was not seriously debated in the Van Zant case mainly because the Court could
have passed it on the Swift v. Tyson doctrine. In 1938, the Tompkins case overruled the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, the main basis for the decision of the Adams,
Thompson, and Van Zant cases.
In the present case, the Court was confronted with a main issue, the validity of
the aforementioned second theory. The Court sustained its validity without really
examining the shaken foundations.
The Hepburn Act merely made certain pass issuances prohibitory, and excepted certain other classes. Nowhere in the Act can be discerned the intent of
Congress to take from the states the right to pass on the incidents of tort law
relative to passes and until they do so the state courts are supreme. The encroachments of federal power through the media of the judicial branch was never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution and should not be allowed a free
reign now.
The danger of these decisions is apparent. By abrogating the doctrine of the
Tompkins case, it allows the United States Supreme Court to formulate rules for
the forty-eight states. It centralizes and binds the state courts to decisions which
cannot be questioned until the same Court reverses itself. All the evils which the
Tompkins case set out to correct can be loosed on a branch of interstate commerce.
The Court, on principles of justice and logic, should have followed the reasoning of the dissent and overruled the previous cases upon which they rest this decision.
Edward L. Twohey
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THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN TEE UNITED STATEs. By Carl
Brent Swisher.' Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. 261 pages. $3.00
-In this short volume the distinguished constitutional historian from John Hopkins
University analyses our constitutional system as it operates today. The book is
timely, and, owing to the insight and skill of the author, it is also significant and
interesting. Though it is a learned and meaty treatise, it is not written for the
specialist but for the general reader anxious to gain a unified understanding of our
present governmental structure. The book consists of a series of lectures delivered
by the author at the University of Chicago during the spring quarter of 1945
under the sponsorship of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of
American Institutions. Thus occasioned, the study aims primarily to educate and
influence public opinion rather than to extend the frontiers of knowledge in a
technical sense.
Designed primarily to promote intelligent citizenship, the book employs a most
pleasing and felicitious combination of the analytical and the historical methods.
1

Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University.
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As the title indicates, the author is concerned with the great fact that our constitutional system, under the impact of two major wars and a major depression, "has
become the source or the channel for a flow of governmental power so great as
to stagger the imagination." To the elucidation of the implications of these trends,
he.brings the ripest products of political philosophy and constitutional law. But
the findings of political and legal science are presented for the most part in a historical context, the stress being laid on the years since the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Even more, the author finds that much in
the recent growth of constitutional power in the United States cannot be fully
understood apart from some knowledge of our entire history. Throughout the
book, notably in the first three chapters---Democratic Conceptions of the Consti.tution," "Shifting Boundaries of Federalism," and "The Pendulum of Checks and
Balances." Swisher summarizes salient aspects of our constitutional history in a
masterly manner.
By their very nature, the author begins, all constitutions confer power. In the
Americati view, however, constitutions are also indispensable limitations upon power
and the manner of its exercise. An American constitution, the author summarizes,
must forbid government to do certain things, must require that certain things be
done only in prescribed ways, must require that government operate strictly according to rule, must embody the rule of "rightness", must be federal, must divide
the powers of government among three co-ordinate branches and must base government upon the consent of the governed. The author demonstrates that Americans today entertain substantially the same ideas on the nature and purpose of government as those which guided the action of the Founding Fathers. Owing largely,
however, to the triumph of mass-production industrialism, the controls of government in the economic field have been vastly extended and new techniques
adopted. In this frame of reference, Swisher clearly pictures our present-day constitutional structure. His skillful marshalling of significant illustrations, mainly
-from recent decisions of the Supreme Court, will visualize for most readers the
sources of and the barriers to expanding power as well as define precisely the existing relations among the three departments and the several administrative agencies.
Much of the book, as in every good treatise on the American constitutional system, deals with the judiciary, particularly the predominantly New Deal Supreme
Court of the last ten years. If until 1937 the Court restricted for the most part
the authority of government over a developing system of private enterprise, the
present justices permit both the federal and state governments to control economic
life as they see fit. In the broad area of the civil liberties, however, the present
Court is more inclined than former ones to put restraints upon government at all
levels.
By and large the author approves the new trends in constitutional interpretation. He realizes that the permeating influence in the American economy of corporate industry, whose methods of control and management reproduce the techniques of autocracy and dictatorship, forces government to intervene in business in
order to maintain unimpaired the people's freedom and welfare. A "new federalism" has emerged, he thinks, to govern the exercise of power in American society.
To the federal and state governments of the old federalism are now added two
great aggregations of economic power, namely, the corporations and the labor
unions. just as the federal government has not absorbed the states, so also it
does not plan to absorb industry. As always, its function is to direct and balance
power. Thus the main body of its industrial legislation aims "to bank corporations one against another in a competitive system" and to inflate labor unions up
"to positions of equality with employing corporations so that the process of collective bargaining can be carried on between parties at the same bargaining level."
Swisher also points out that the impact of corporate industry on government is
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likely to be more than national: the approximation of a world state, if and when
it comes, may come not merely for the prevention of war but also for the control
of state-created corporations which have grown so powerful as to become laws unto
themselves.
Thus Professor Swisher finds a place for economic institutions within our
present-day constitutional system. His success in integrating corporation and trade
union law into the traditional body of our constitutional doctrine gives his book
a unique place in American historiography. The book, now in its third printing,
seems destined to achieve its author's aim: arousing citizens to a more intelligent
understanding of their great frame of government and charter of liberties. On the
thinking and conduct of the people our freedom from tyranny depends. "The
ultimate safeguard of the constitutional system," he concludes, "is watchfulness,
understanding, and participation on the part of the American people. With the
people properly on guard and properly active, the growth of constitutional power
in the United States should be a matter of pride and not at all of anxious concern."
Aaron I. Abell*

TuE LAw OF Wxs AND TUE MANNM oF THmm DRATiNG, EXECUTiON, PRoBATE AND INTERPRETATION ToomxTrx WirH TESTENTARY FoaRs. By George W.
Thompson, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1947. 1444 pages. $20.00.
Third Edition. Pocket Supplement, 95 pages.--"A truce to jesting; let me have a
confessor to confess me, and a notary to make my will." The Institute of Natural
Law at The University of Notre Dame College of Law in December 1947 restated
in the light of today the law of God and the law of man in relation to basic legal
institutions. The "will" from the beginning of time is one of these institutions.
With the new marital deduction for gift and estate taxes under the 1948 Revenue
Act obliquely causing an examination of extant wills the profession will welcome
this third edition of Thompson ON W Ts. It has been a vade mecum of many
lawyers since 1916.
The present volume follows the basic pattern of its earlier editions of 1916 and
1936 but adds about 2,500 new cases, statutory developments, etc. Excerpts from
the state statutes relating to pertinent provisions of the law of wills are contained
in the 1948 Pocket Supplement that is found in the pocket flap of the book . . .
a very valuable legal tool in view of the fact that the law of wills isnot uniform
in the various jurisdictions. A recent case involving a conflict of laws caused an
estate to suffer a loss of several thousand dollars because the testator's will did not
contemplate that property in a foreign state would not necessarily pass under a
will that satisfied the law of his home state. There are other vagaries in recent
statutes, for example a California law in effect since September 12, 1947 provides
that a person ". . . may by will dispose of the whole or any part of his or her
body . . ." to certain beneficiaries.
In breaking down the contents of the book, one finds fifty per cent text material on the law of Wills; ten per cent on the law of Trusts; twenty per cent
legal Forms; ten per cent Table of Cases; and ten per cent Index. Chapter 37,
Suggestions for Drafting and Executing Wills, is one of importance to every lawyer,
and in the light of modern developments of this thorny subject its eighteen pages
will have to be supplemented. If the precedent of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
*Assistant Professor of History, University of Notre Dame.
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Court of. the United States, Edward D. White, is followed no addition will be
necessary; his last will consisted of five lines.
The historical sketch of the law on Wills on pp. 17-18 is too brief to unfold
the fascinating and instructive historical continuity of the subject. Whether a person starts with the will of Uah written on papyrus and traces the unfolding of
the law from ancient times through the biblical period and in the Roman era or
commences from the time that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary
in England, the influence of Roman Law, Civil Law, and Canon Law must be
observed in our'present statutes. A will was considered as a testament to God
and the first concern of the testator was for the repose of his soul. The early
form of a will in England contained such clauses as the following: "My body is
to be buried inChurchyard, and I give toward the repairing of the said
Church .........
. ...
$........., and also $ ......for Masses for the repose of my
soul." Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in early common law over the goods of the
testator explains some of the rules applicable today and that is only one reason why
the law of wills has to be given considerable historical attention.
The format and typography of this volume is excellent. The type is large
enough to be readily readable. The style is simple and the margins are fine. This
book is neither too large nor too thick. The press-work and binding is beyond
criticism. A timely preface and liberal table of contents enables a person to determine what is in the volume.
You wal find this third edition of Thompson on Wills a valuable asset to your
library. Its recognition by three generations of lawyers tolls the statute of prescriptive veneration. As I write on Shakespeare's birthday (sic) it seems fitting
to close with the opening words of his will: "In the name of God, Amen!"
John W. Curran*

EcoNoMifcs or PUBLC UTIxIIEs. By Emery Troxel.1 New York: Rinehart and
Co., 1947. 892 pages. $5.75.-The lawyers and administrators engaged in the work
of regulating and administrating the utility industries should be particularly interested in the present volume. Like nearly all books on the subject written in
the last decade or so, it is primarily a college text on the economics of water,
urban-transportation, gas, electric, telephone and radio-broadcasting industries.
But, it is also a valuable source book for those responsible for the state or federal
,controls of the utility enterprises.
The first commendable feature of the volume as a reference book is its recency.
Since the early 1930's there has been an unprecedented growth of the so-called
traditional (i. e., water, transportation, gas, electric and telephone) utilities, as
well as of the new utility enterprises such as radio broadcasting, motor carriers
and aviation (the latter two utility industries are not treated in the present volume). The expansion of these utilities necessitated additional regulation, especially
in the federal field. The Communications Act, the Motor Carrier Act, the Federal
Power Act and the Natural Gas Act were all enacted in the period between 1934
and 1938. The author of the volume traces the historical development of local,
state and federal controls of the utility enterprises and also indicates the present
*Professor of Law, De Paul University.
1 Associate Professor of Economics, Wayne University.
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day trends in regulation. The current developments are well-documented with
state and federal court citations and excerpts from the leading cases. It is unfortunate that the author places his footnote references in the back of the book
under appropriate chapter headings, rather than on the page where the foot note
appears. This detracts somewhat from the usefulness of the present volume as a
quick source of reference.
The timeliness of the book is not, however, its sole attainment. It is also an
excellent economic study of the important problems of the utility businesses. The
author, unlike many academic writers, has applied the methods of economic analysis to some very concrete and practical problems that are currently important
in dealing with either the managerial or the regulatory aspects of the utility industries.
The first two chapters are devoted to an explanation of the legal concept and
economic characteristics of utilities. The next three chapters, as already indicated
above, trace the growth of regulatory controls. This done, the author proceeds
without delay in tackling the problems of utility economics. Chapter 6 emphasizes the importance of accounting control in the utility regulatory field. The
author notes that: "If accounting procedures are carefully prescribed, the commissions have access to revenue, cost, and property valuation facts that can be used
for earnings, price, and financial regulation." 2 This emphasis on accounting control is an accepted feature of all efficient regulation, local, state or federal, yet only
one other fairly recent text 8 gives it the deserved prominence that it enjoys in
the present volume. The importance of accounting controls cannot be denied. It
was the need for such regulatory accounting supervision that led to the adoption
of a uniform system of accounts by state and federal commissions.
The chapters in the present volume dealing with the control of competition,
depreciation, rate of return and obsolescence are also very timely. Interutility
rivalry and a needless duplication of service present very real problems to the
regulatory authorities. The certificate of public convenience and necessity has
been a means for checking undesirable competition that is harmful to the public
interest, but the problems that arise from these competitive situations are still
unsettled not only in the case of the older utilities, but also in the newer utility
industries4.
The author analyzes the problem of depreciation in an impartial manner, noting
all the new legal views on the subject of depreciation deductions, observed depreciation deductions, and the reserve requirement. His analysis and discussion of depreciation are comparable in thoroughness to the excellent5 article on this problem
Both appear to have
written by Professor Freeman in a leading law periodical.
an excellent grasp of the fundamental matters involved in the problem of depreciation. The problem of the rate of return is analyzed by the author from the
viewpoint of the modem judicial recognition of the complementary relation of the
reasonable-return and the reasonable depreciation cost. The chapter on obsolescence presents the problem in terms of accounting, thus ensuring a practical method of measurement of the obsolescence value. Regulatory policy can then be
evolved from these measurements.
Fully five chapters are on the subject of utility price structures. This extensive treatment of pricing is entirely warranted, for, as the author states, control
2

Page 116.

a

See BARNES, THE ECONOIcS OF PUBLIC UTILnI=

REGULATION, c. VIII.

See Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrierfor Niw Air Transport Routes, 16
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1.
5 See Freeman, Public Utility Depreciation, 32 Coa. L. Q. 4.
4

631
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6
It is still
of price differentiation is the important problem of price regulation.
the contention of the utilities that price-fixing is a managerial functon, but many
commission and court decisions are now placing some of the price-fixing functions under social control. The regulatory commissions are becoming more and
more aware of the fact that the social and economic effects of price structures are
no longer within the exclusive province of utility managers.

The author's chapters on municipal utility systems and multiple-purpose projects are noteworthy. He believes that the expansion of federal river projects will
stimulate the expansion of the municipal systems,7 and that, generally, municipal
8
This is the only part of the
ownership spells price advantages to the consumer.
book wherein the author is rather partial; his discussion of the regional projects,
both federal and non-federal, is more objective.
The omission by the author of chapters on the public relations and propaganda
activities of public utilities, which are customarily included by other authors in
similar textbooks, is praiseworthy. The discussion of such utility ventures would
subtract from the fine analyss of the more important concrete problems that obtain
in this field of enterprise.
Louis Charles Kaplan*

1
TAxATioN FoR Paosp=rr. By Randolph E. Paul. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1947. 448 pages. $4.0.-That confession is good for the soul is a
truism unquestioned by the civilized. That such confession should take place in
the market place is subject to question. A large portion of the first of the three
books into which Mr. Randolph Paul, one-time Tax Advisor to Secretary Morgenthau, later General Counsel and Acting Secretary of the Treasury in charge of
Foreign Funds Control, divides his latest work on federal taxation, falls under
the foregoing strictures against public confessions.
This first portion of Mr. Paul's new volume is devoted to a brief historical recapitulation of the history of the federal revenue acts since the Supreme Court's
invalidation of the income tax re-imposed by Congress in 1894 in the much men2
tioned, seldom read, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company. The remaining two books in the volume, Problems of Future Tax Policy and a Federal Tax
System for the Future, essay a more ambitious role.

Taxation for Prosperity being a laudable, if not wholly successful, attempt to
popularize a difficult and little under understood field-the impact and potentialities of federal taxation upon our economy and way of life-it is perhaps churlish
to observe that what may be termed Mr. Paul's brief partisan raids along the historical borders of the Cleveland-McKinley-Roosevelt-Taft era have been more
8
notably led by other literary free-booters. His almost blow-by-blow description
6 Page 532.
7 Page 656.
8 Page 664.
*Attorney, Bureau of Law, Federal Power Commission, Washington, D. C.
Member of the New York Bar.
1
2 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759; 158 U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912, 39
L. Ed. 1108.
a SuLm.iAx, OUR Trars, for, the general picture, and Robert Swaine's HISTORY
OF THE CRAVATH Fm:m, for the forces at work in the Pollock case.
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of the more recent war-time legislation from the time he went to Washington in
1941 through 1946 might well have been labeled Apologia Pro Vita Sua in Aerorio.
Though perhaps the writing of these pages provided the raison d'etre for the entire book, they add but little to Mr. Paul's professional stature. Circulated
among friends as a private brochure, Chapters 12 through 17 would have served
to highlight an interesting portion of a busy career.
Unfortunately this volume, dedicated to the high purpose of charting a tax
program for a solvent and prosperous America, is much marred by that grave,
often fatal, stylistic defect, over-generality. Concreteness yet remains the essence
of impelling prose. Chapter 38 on the subject of social security is perhaps the most
stimulating portion of this volume. Yet it, too, suffers from generalities and a
pervading failure to come to grips with the myriad of concretions which underlie
the Social Security Acts. Specific cases breathe life into "employee," "employer,"
"unemployment insurance" and "dependency benefits." Mr. Paul has passed them
over in favor of an intricate matching of such literary cliches as "one world",
"dynamic factors in the world economy," "realistic long-term program" and "face
the challenge of an unfathomable future" and even "sound economics." And this
from an author familiar with Arnold's Folklore of Capitalisml
Mr. Paul's tax blueprint for a prosperous future is distressingly vague both in
outline and detail. Estate and gift taxes should be strengthened by correlation.
Social security is to be extended. Excise taxes are to be "handled with careful
regard for the relative importance of various taxed commodities to the maintenance of a prosperous economy." In brief the problem is stated, not solved.
Taxes must be "fair" we are solemnly told. "Fairness" cannot be achieved
while the present depletion allowances for oil, gas and various minerals are permitted, while the Treasury remains "temperamentally" unfit to utilize the full
scope of its rule-making power, while persons of great wealth avoid income taxes
through the ownership of tax-exempt bonds. All this is doubtless true. Nowhere,
however, does the author examine the political realities of his program. If the
solution of these three problems, deemed necessary to achieve "fairness", is not
capable of political realization either now or in the immediately forseeable future,
does Mr. Paul's thesis offer us a workable guide?
"Taxes for More than Revenue" is a central theme of this book. And a challenging theme it is. An auspicious start is made with the humbling admission
that: "The formula for a dynamic economy is not discoverable by taxes alone." 4
We are not further informed, however, as to just what the limitations are upon
the doctrine of using the nation's taxing power for social alms over and above
the production of revenue. A score of taxes have been" levied to achieve ends
other than the strict raising of revenue. Gift and estate taxes produce little
revenue and Mr. Paul has already expressed the widespread doubt "whether inheritance and estate taxes do achieve a redistribution of wealth."5 Poll taxes disenfranchise; margarine taxes subsidize the dairy interests. Tariffs no longer are
looked upon as prime fiscal supports of the nation. Though brushing against them
in passing, Mr. Paul foregoes the tantalizing opportunity of probing the meaty
interiors of these rich kernels.
Equally disappointing and superficial is the author's treatment of whether taxation kills initiative and dries up the wellsprings of risk capital. Excessive taxation
of lower income groups in England-the miners in particular-has led to a direct
fall in production. Mr. Paul confines himself to the imponderables of whether
4
5

PAuL, TAXATIoN FoR PRosp mrn, 219 (1947).
PAUL, FEDmuL EsTATE AND GIrT TAXAmON 1, 46 (1942).
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high taxes on the rich result in loss of incentive on their part. As to risk-capital,
he assumes it comes from the upper middle and wealthy classes. Today riskcapital is supplied directly in ever-increasing volume by the nation's larger banks,
insurance companies, and by the federal government -itself. The resources of these
organizations stem in large measure from the lower middle and lower economic
classes.
Mr. Paul has for almost a score of years been an ornament to the nation's -tax
bar. From the lecture platform, through countless law review articles, three bound
studies in federal taxation, and finally through his peerless three volumes on federal estate and gift taxation, Randolph Paul has helped to illumine the minds of
bench, bar and classroom. Is it too much to hope that the source of this urbane
illumination, having re-fought the fiscal battles of World War II in public print,
may find catharsis through his castigation of his conniving but shamelessly successful rival, Beardsley Ruml? Those of us who have heretofore found both
profit and pleasure in Nr. Paul's writings sincerely hope so.
Robert T. Molloy*

LAw As AN INsTRUi ENT or SOCIAL POLICY: TaE BRANDES THERY.
iam Theresa Rooney.' THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM, January, 1948.

By Mir-

"Law As An Instrument of Social Policy" is a short but scholarly study of the
Brandeis theory of law by Dr. Miriam T. Rooney, whose analyses of contemporary juridical the6ry have won her recognition both in legal and in philosophical
circles. Here, as in her study of Cardozo 2, Dr. Rooney has traced the law behind
the law-the philosophy that consciously or unconsciously shaped the legal decisions of a distinguished American jurist.
Although deeply sympathetic with Justice Brandeis' concern for the rights of
labor, his refusal to identify the common good with corporation profits, and his
attack on the unnecessary centralization of power in the federal government, Dr.
Rooney clearly shows that behind much of this laudable liberalism lay a Kantian
concept of liberty whose only limits were the interests of others, and an equally
vague concept of brotherhood whose social improvement was the sole end of the
individual.
Wisely refusing to restrict her study to a destructive criticism of these concepts in Justice Brandeis' philosophy of law, Dr. Rooney points out the strength
as well as the weaknesses in his theory, especially his insistence that reason, not
private will or public caprice, should be the controlling factor in positive law,
and that positive law is a means, not an end, in corporate society.
In fact, so intent is Dr. Rooney on fairly presenting the philosophical theories
of Justice Brandeis and on making allowances for his well-intentioned errors that
she concedes that "Through the confidence placed in the reason of each person
and his natural tendency toward the good when given opportunity for free choice,
the theory contains the essential elements of a valid concept of democracy." This
is more than the present reviewer is willing to concede. Any legal theorist who denies, as Justice Brandeis denied, that the soul is immortal, thereby excludes an
*Member of the New York Bar.
1

2

Associate Editor, The New Scholasticism.
The New Scholasticism, January, 1948.
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essential element of true democracy. Such exclusion logically leads to totalitarianism. If man has no end, no fulfilment, that transcends society, he is necessarily reduced to a mere part of a political whole. He has no rights, no duties other than

those which the state grants or recognizes. This was, in fact, as Dr. Rooney
notes earlier, the conclusion drawn by Justice Brandeis himself: "All rights are
derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises

duty to the community."

Needless to say, to include in one's legal theory the

immortality of the soul and its natural destiny, after death, to an intimate (not

intuitive) knowledge of God does not involve an appeal to theology or to revelation. These are not "supernatural facts": both data can be and, historically, have
been ascertained by reason. The only source of man's intrinsic dignity, their inclusion is critical for any sound philosophy of law.
All this, of course, is quite clear to Dr. Rooney, as would be evident if the
statement quoted above were taken in context with her other writings. But since

there has appeared in recent years among certain legal philosophers (Dr. Rooney
is not one of them) a tendency to base the dignity of man merely upon his possession of intellectual powers, the fact that man's intrinsic dignity is ultimately
based on his final ordination to God cannot be overstressed.
One might suggest, however, that to speak, as Dr. Rooney speaks, of man's

reason as a "faculty which intuitively indicates conformity of his action with natural law" (italics ours), might possibly lead to misunderstanding. While the basic
principles of natural law are known with relative ease, their application, as well as
the more difficult principles themselves, is often known only after considerable reflection and experience.
The statement that Justice Brandeis "embraced the Jewish doctrine of disbelief in personal immortality" might also have been more carefully qualified. Even
though large numbers of unorthodox Jews have denied the immortality of the
soul, this disbelief can hardly be called typical of the Jewish religion as known
historically.
But the chief task which Dr. Rooney set out to do is admirably executed. In
a little more than fifty pages, she has gathered together the salient features of Justice Brandeis' legal theory, traced them back to their philosophic sources, calmly
and critically weighed each. In this short study, the legal theorist, as well as the
practicing lawyer, will find the dearest picture yet presented of the complex
forces that moulded the mind and decisions of the late Louis Brandeis.
R. W. Mulligan, S. J.*

CASES ONr FEnRAL AXrx-TRusT LAWS. By S. Chesterfield Oppenheim.1 St.
Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 194.-In this splendid. casebook
Professor Oppenheim presents the first part of his two volume revision of his
earlier casebook on Trade Regulation (1936). A companion effort, Cases On
Unfair Competition, is in print and soon will make its appearance.
In the volume reviewed here, the author has isolated the cases and materials
relevant to that part of a course in trade regulation which deals with the public
policy of preserving or enforcing competition within the framework of the
*West Baden College, Loyola University.
I Professor of Law, George Washington University.
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American competitive enterprise system. To the extent that the public policy behind the anti-trust laws is aimed at preserving free competition by punishing those
who deviate from that article of economic faith, this work deals with the negative
aspects of trade regulation. However, the book is extensively cross reference
to the impending work on unfair competition which will treat of the affirmative
attempts not only to preserve, but to raise, the plane of fair competition. Therefore, Professor Oppenheim's isolating of the anti-trust material is not sterile in
nature, but is an intelligent, practical dichotomization of the complex and overlapping subject of trade regulation.
Moreover, this severing maneuver eliminates the disadvantage of bulkiness inherent in any single casebook which attempts to span the field. It makes easier
too, the opportunity to conduct separate courses in trade regulation, one dealing
with anti-trust problems, the other with those of unfair competition.
An outstanding feature of the casebook is the inclusion of excellent non-case
material. Unlike other attempts along these lines, Professor Oppenheim has forsworn the practice of cluttering up his work with endless extracts on the economic
and business background which is admittedly necessary for proper student apprehension of the subject. Instead, the author has, in most cases, summarized, in
cogent, objective, explanatory editorial comments, the non-legal background material relevant to the various sections of the book. The-same technique is relied
on to cover many of the cases of lesser importance which, nevertheless, still form
a necessary part of the subject matter. However, in addition to the editorial
comments, there are specially prepared background texts. All these devices not
only serve to economize casebook pages and classroom time, but also to stimulate
student interest in a great measure. This intellectural titillation is a necessary
adjunct in any attempt to teach successfully a subject such as trade regulation to
law school students, many of whom lack a good pre-law background in economics.
Not only does the non-case material inserted by the author provide stimuli to
student interest, it also directs the attention of the student to the currently evolving doctrines of anti-trust law, carrying those who wish to go to the frontier regions in the legal-economic field of trade regulation.
The content of the book is arranged in an orderly fashion which combines the
twin virtues of continuity of presentation and re-occuring novelty of subject matter. After dealing with ancillary and non-ancillary restraints of trade at common
law in the first two chapters, the author takes us into the Sherman Act in chapter
three. In this chapter Professor Oppenheim, through skillful use of editorial comment, special text, and a comprehensive check list of the American private competitive enterprise system, points up vividly the conflicting economic and social
forces around which are fought the battle against monopoly. The next three
chapters form part two of the book and treat of mergers, consolidations, and
monopoly under the federal anti-trust laws. The chapter on monopoly which
ends with the horizon-opening Yellow Cab case, 2 and the one which deals with
the major hole in the anti-monopoly dike, Section 7 of the Clayton Act,3 are
especially well presented.
Part three of the casebook deals with individual transactions and loose associations under. the anti-trust laws. Beginning with chapter seven on price-fixing
agreements not predicated on legal monopolies, the author winds a progressively
unfolding and interrelated courie through trade associations and their characteristics and activities, resale price maintenance and the "fair trade" act debates, and
2 United States v. Yellow Cab Co. et al.; 332 U. S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1560, 91
L. Ed. 1594 (1947).
3 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. 12 et seq. (1940).
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delivered price systems. All these controversial areas of anti-trust law are fairly
and fully painted; no attempt at dogmatism is tried in a field where its espousal
would not only be poor teaching, but bad lawyering. This is not to say, however,
that Professor Oppenhein's presentation does not allow the acute student to grasp
with sufficient certitude the evolving trends where their outlines are fairly discernible.
Chapter eleven, dealing with legal monopolies and the anti-trust laws, is an
excellent portrayal, with fine perspective, of the delicate balancing of anti-trust
policy with the public policy behind the American patent system. It is here that
the author demonstrates beyond cavil that he is one who does not shrink in the
face of slogans or shibboleths, and that he is one who agrees with Judge Frank
that the "problem is not whether there should be monopolies, but rather, what
monopolies there should be, and whether and how much they should be regulated." 4
After considering exclusive arrangements, tying devices, and trade boycotts,
the author closes part three of the book, appropriately enough, with a chapter on
foreign commerce and international cartels under the anti-trust laws. This last
chapter is one of the more noteworthy completely new additions to his first casebook on trade regulation. Its inclusion is additional evidence of the modernism
and timeliness of Professor Oppenheim's work. The last part of the book is an interesting treatment of the problem of remedies under the anti-trust laws. While
certainly worthy of consideration, its place at the end of the volume allows more
easily its exclusion in those cases where time limitations curtail the amount of material which can be taken up in a course. There are excellent appendices to the
book including those on the Sherman, Clayton, Federal Trade Commission, and
Webb Export Trade Acts. This reviewer would like to have seen the RobinsonPatman Act inserted but since it undoubtedly will be found in the casebook on
unfair competition, he will not voice that single minor criticism.
Indeed, then, the author has created a work which is both an outstanding
teaching tool and also an excellent contribution to the literature of the law of antitrust. Its appearance at a time when the growing concentration of economic
power may well threaten the continued existence of the American free competitive
economy is most fortunate. Professor Oppenhein, with intellectual humility and
scholarly objectivity, reveals himself in the pages of his casebook as one who understands completely what a really free economy is, and on what foundations it
necessarily must rest. His cult is a rare one; but may his tribe increase.
Alfred Long Scanlan*

IMiACT or nn Naw LABoR LAW ON UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS. By Leo
C. Brown, S. J.1 St. Louis: Institute of Social Order, St. Louis University, 1948.
114 pages. $1.50-Essentially, this booklet is a question-and-answer discussion of
the Taft-Hartley Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 including the full text
of the law.
4 Frank, J., concurring in Picard v. United Aircraft Corp. 128 F. (2d) 632,
643 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
*Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1

Associate Professor of Economics, St. Louis University.
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In his preface, the author points out that the booklet is not intended to be
expert-and a priori-legalor juridical opinion. Rather, it is an interpretation of
application of the new amendments to concrete situations that may arise. Several
attorneys and personnel men gave the author the benefit of their experience, along
with union representatives who posed many of the questions.
Because of the skillful organization of the booklet, it is a usable, quick-reference handbook. Some considerable value is added in an appendix covering such
things as labor organization registration forms, financial data certificates, and
loyalty affidavit forms. For those not having easy access to the weekly reporting
service the booklet is well worthwhile.
John H. Sheehan*

SEwwm Whi'nm s o BENsAmnm NATmeN CAmiozo, Edited by Margaret E.
Hall.1 New York: Fallon Publications, 1947. 456 pages. $5.--"The significance of
the record of his life lies in the fact that in youth and at college and in manhood,
as a lawyer and as a judge, in work of ever widening importance, he gathered an
ever widening circle of friends-an ever increasing influence in the development of
2
That Cardozo was a popular
the law and in the administration of Justice."
judge may be inferred from the universal approbation and acclaim that greeted
his elevation from the New York Court of Appeas to the Supreme Court of the
United States. That he was a great judge can be discerned from the tenor of his
decisions and their influence upon the course and content of our law. "No other
judge of his time was so deft in weaving the precedents of centuries into a new
shape to govern a new society." 3
But there are those amongst his disciples who point to the extra-judicial utterances rather than judicial opinions as constituting his contribution to the literature
and philosophy of American law. "His extra-judicial writings contain his more
articulate philosophy of law, and are thus more likely to be enduring than his
4
The one does complement the other as can be seen
opinions as a judge.".
from Cardozo's appraisal of the effect of personal philosophy upon the law. "The
works of any man must always partake, in large degree, of the spirit of the man
himself; and the more pronounced and earnest his views may be, the more the
truths he has discerned burden him and press for utterance, the more constantly
will they dominate his writings, and the more clearly will his writings reflect the
workings of his spirit." 5 And again, "We may try to see things as objectively as
6
we please. None the less we can never see them with any eyes except our own."
To evaluate adequately his contributions to the science of jurisprudence and the
bases of his judicial opinions we must discover and analyze his philosophy of law
and the place of philosophy in the law. The present collection seeks to trace the
development of this philosophy from Cardozo's undergraduate days titColumbia
*Head, Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame.
1 Reference Law Librarian, Columbia University Law Library.
2 Lehman, MEirOa-AL 3 SErmcTED WRnINs or BENjAm:IN NATHAN CARwOzo
xiii.
3 Cummings, IN MEMoRY OF BENyAmI NATN CARDOZO 6 (1938).
4 Patterson, Forward to Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo V.
5 SErE-zcr WR=Ns oF BENjAmI" NATHAN CARDoZo 61 (The Moral Element
in Matthew Arnold).
6 id. at 110 (The Nature of the Judicial Process).
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(The Altruist in Politics) to the eve of his appointment to the Supreme Court of
the United States (Jurisprudence). As an attempt to present the development and
the synthesis of Cardozo's legal thought, it is commendable. But as an attempt to
foist the tenets of sociological jurisprudence upon the legal profession and the
general public, it is condemnable.
It has been said7 that "His was a life-long quest: How does the law grow?
How does it bridge the gap between the experiences of yesterday and the needs
of today? How can it be a permanent thing, something to rely and act upon, and
yet fulfill the changing exigencies of the hour?" Noting that the work of modi8
fication was a gradual one, Cardozo concluded that "Out of the ferment there
will come a new philosophy that will guide the thought of our successors". 9
This philosophy, dominated by the sociological school of jurisprudence looks to
the morality of the community as the pattern of justice: "I hold it for my part
to be so much of morality as juristic thought discovers to be wisely and efficiently
enforceable by the aid of jural sanctions." IV But the function of the judge is
something more than merely reflecting the mores; "The judge interprets the social
conscience and gives effect to it in law, but in so doing he helps to form and
modify the conscience he interprets." 11 The effect of discovering the social conscience and applying settled rules of law thereto in the mind of Cardozo, establishes the premise that all is relative. "The more we study law in the making,
at least in its present stages of development, the more we gain the sense of a
gradual striving towards an end, shaped by a logic which, eschewing the quest for
certainty, must be satisfied if its conclusions are rooted in the probable." 12 And
again, "The principle of relativity in the adaptation of the law to conduct may
point the way to change." 13
In Te Nature of the Judicial Process14 Cardozo analyzes the judicial process
as being: "logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards
of right conduct . . . which singly or in combination shape the progress of the
law."' 5 As guides in determining the tendencies of development and growth
of the law he proposes four tests:"The directive force of a principle may be exacted along the line of logical progression; this I will call the rule of analogy or the
method of philosophy; along the line of historical development; this I will call
the method of evolution; along the line of the customs of the community; this I
will call the method of tradition; along the lines of justice, morals and social
welfare, the mores of the day; and this I will call the method of'sociology." 16
Admitting that there are certain jural principles that limit the freedom of the
judge 17 Cardozo nevertheless concludes that "the final cause of law is the welfare of society" 18 and "the law of nature is no longer conceived of as something
static and eternal. It does not override human or positive law." 19
Swygert, Bejamin N. Cardozo, 22 NoTRE DAmE LAwvra 144 (1947).
8 SLEcTao> WR InNGS OF BENM AmI N. CARDozo 115 (The Nature of the Judicial Process).
9 id. at 104 (Faith and a Doubting World).
10 id. at 273 (Paradoxes of Legal Science).
11 id. at 228 (Growth of the Law).
12 id. at 217 (Growth of the Law).
Ia id. at 260 (Paradoxes of Legal Science).
14 id. at 107-184.
15 id. at 153 (The Nature of the Judicial Process).
16 id, at 117 (The Nature of the Judicial Process).
17 id. at 160 (The Nature of the Judicial Process).
18 id. at 133 (The Nature of the Judicial Process).
19 id. at 161 (The Nature of the Judicial Process).
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At this point we must distinguish Cardozo the jurist from Cardozo the legal
philosopher. We may subscribe to the liberal decisions20, which "weave the
precedents of centuries into a new shape to govern a new society" 21 and which
logically extended do not conflict with basic tenets of moral law. But it is a2
2
far'different proposition to espouse the "more articulate philosophy of law"
characteristic of his extra-judicial writings. Here again we are faced with the
dilemma of conforming to Cardozo's rule for criticism: "It is criticism's part to
distinguish and separate in the first
instance what has been well, from what has
been badly said." 28 It will suffice to note the effects of the ingratiatingly poputhings well but things which at the same
lar style of William James who said
24
time were philosophically unsound.
Relativism characterizes Cardozo's expressed philosophy of law. Applying the
scientific methods of inductive reasoning and generalizations "it accepts a theory
of agnosticism which holds that .. . we can know the absolute only in the relative.
...Since all is change in life, law must correspond to the facts of life and therefore
legal rules and principles are not final truths but hypotheses, the only test of
whose validity is the pragmatic one of trial and error." 25 What then is to be
the criterion in determining whether a thing is lawful or unlawful? "The moral
code of each generation, this amalgam of custom and philosophy and many an
intermediate grade of conduct and belief, supplies2 a6 norm or standard of behavior
which struggles to make itself articulate in law."
But are there no immutable principles or is relativity always the test? "Principles are complex bundles. It is well enough to say that we shall be consistent,
but consistent with what"? 27 As opposed to this thesis of Cardozo, we say
consistent with the natural law. "Natural law is the principle of laws. Laws
are the application of that principle in the government of human conduct. Without the laws, the principle is sterile. But without the principle, the laws would
be irresponsible and anarchic." 28
But what of the contention that "law must be stable and yet it cannot stand
still." 2- To which we reply: "Law involves constancy and change. The constancy is in the principle, which lies behind the facts; the change is in the rule
which includes the facts." 30 And "Positive rules are not deductions from natural
law; they are determinations of it." 81
20 Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88; McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 217
N. Y. 382.
21 See note 3 supra.
22 See note 4 supra.
28 SELa
D WRrrnNGs OF BENJAnmm NATrAa CARDOZO 68 (Moral Element in
Matthew Arnold).
24 Palmer, The Natural Law and Pragmatism, 23 NoTRE DAm LAWYER 317
(1948).
25 ROoNEY, MR. JusTicE CAnnozo's RELATIVIsm 36 (1945).
26 SELECTED WRI=NGS OF BENyAMiN NATHAN CARDOZO 261 (Paradoxes of
Legal Science).
27 id. at 132.
28 McKinnon, Natural Law and Positive Law, 23 NoTRa DAm LAWYER 137
(1948).
29 SELECTED WRITINGS or Buj-Amn
NATHAm CARozo 86, 249 (Growth of
the Law).
80 McKinnon, op. cit. supra note 28, at 137.
81 id. at 136.
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All of which the sociological jurisprudence theorists may say is a distinction
without a difference. And yet the dangers attendant upon discarding the principle
of laws, the natural law, for a relativity based upon what the majority deem to be
right are ever about us. An outstanding example is the opinion of Justice Holmes
in the case of Buck v. Bell: 32 "We have seeh more than once that the public
welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices (sterilization) . . . in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. . . . The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes." This is the same Holmes of whom
Cardozo wrote: 33 "He is today for all students of law and for all students of
human society, the philosopher and the seer, the greatest of our age in the domain
of jurisprudence, and one of the greatest of the ages." And again, "No one has
labored more incessantly to demonstrate the truth that rights are never absolute,
though they are ever struggling and tending to declare themselves as such." 34
Cardozo, like Holmes, is committed to the theory that rights are relative, never
absolute. "My admiration for Holmes goes almost to the point of worship." 35
To refute the contention that the theory of relativity is working and has worked
in practice with few ill effects, we look to Cardozo, and his discussion of the form
and content of judicial decisions: "Most of us are so uncertain of our strength,
so beset with doubts and difficulties, that we feel oppressed with the need of justifying every holding by analogies and precedents and an exposure of the reasons." 85
But "one does not need to justify oneself if one is the mouthpiece of divinity." 37
Such would be the effect of relativity run rampant. And yet we find praise
and unquestioned endorsement of its ramifications. "Political leaders, newspaper
editors and moralists unversed in the law who now grope within the labyrinth of
empiricism and subjectivism, would find many of their most perplexing problems
elucidated if not completely solved in Cardozo's interpretation of the origin, the
nature, the growth and the function of law." 38
However, neither Holmes nor Cardozo were so convinced of the correctness of
their hypotheses as to be free of doubt. "Sceptic of many things, of many boasted
certainties, he is sceptic even of himself",S3
Cardozo says of Holmes. And he
confesses a similar distrust: "In those hours of discouragement to which not even
experience is a stranger, I feel at moments the same doubt, paralyzing effort with
its whispers of futility." 40
In what direction, then, is the science of jurisprudence to turn? Constancy
and conviction will be found only in a philosophy of legislation and judicial opinion which is based on a recognition of the fundamental (natural) law and in
the application thereto of right reason. The positivism and absolutism which finds
expression in the relativistic approach to our present day needs has been ineffective
32

274 U. S. 200, 207, 47 S. Ct. 584, 71 L. Ed. 1000 (1927).
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34 id. at 82.
35 id. at 103 (Faith and a Doubting World); cf. notes 12 and 13 supra.
36 id. at 345 (Law and Literature).
37 id. at 344 (Law and Literature).
38 Aronson, CARDozo's DOCTRINE OF SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1938).
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and has spawned the popular as distinguished from the just approach.41 Miss
Hall, in collecting and editing these extra-judicial works of Cardozo, has served
to coalesce one school of thought. But she has done more. Unintentionally she
has focused the attention of the discriminating reader on the basic conflict of contemporary society-the inalienable rights of man. "If anything is becoming
dear," said Mr. Ben W. Palmer,4 2 "to this confused revolutionary generation
when the foundations of civilization are shaken to the depths, it is that law like
life, needs an integrating philosophy that will give some objective standards, some
sure footing amidst the shifting sands of crumbling secular institutions. You and
I know that the answer lies in the further invigoration and wider acceptance of
scholastic natural law."
Robert E. Sullivan

41 cf. RooNLY, IRnr.rTivmr nM
iN A
_.scAN
LAW (1945).
42 Minneapolis Attorney, speaking before the First Natural Law Institute
sponsored by the College of Law, University of Notre Dame, December 1947.
Speech printed in 23 NoTRE D.mm LAwvna 313. Portion quoted appears at page
340 (1948).
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